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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J O S E P H M. Q U A G L I A N A and 
P A U L A L. Q U A G L I A N A , 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
.;• ••..-. '.: .• . . . . v s . 
E X Q U I S I T E H O M E B U I L D E R S , 
INC., and A L L A N K R U C K E N -
BERG, G A R Y M A R G E T T S , d-b-a 
KM D E S I G N , 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
13723 
B R I E F O F R E S P O N D E N T 
E X Q U I S I T E H O M E B U I L D E R S , INC. 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
This is an action upon two separate contracts by-
property owners against a building contractor and de-
signers or draftsman wherein the building contractor 
and the designers both counterclaimed against the prop-
erty owners. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
This action was tried to the court sitting without a 
jury. Judgment was entered for the contractor in the 
amount of $1,577.73, together with attorney's fees of 
$1,182.00, and for the designers in the amount of 
$500.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., seeks 
an affirmation of its judgment against plaintiffs. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Defendant Exquisite Home Builders, Inc. (here-
inafter referred to as Exquisite) disagrees, in material 
part, to the Statement of Facts submitted by plaintiffs. 
Sometime during the early part of the year 1971, 
Dr. and Mrs. Quagliana (plaintiffs and appellants) 
considered the prospect of building a home (R. 164). 
For this purpose the plaintiffs elected to use house plans 
which had previously been used by Mrs. Quagliana's 
father (R. 164). Since those plans were inadequate 
(R. 350) and since the plaintiff desired to change those 
plans (R. 165), defendant Margetts of KM Design 
was contacted (R. 165). 
At the time KM Design was contacted, the plain-
tiffs had not yet found or purchased a lot upon which 
2 
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the house was to be constructed (R. 166). The Quag-
liana insisted that any lot provide a view of the valley 
from the back of the house (R. 167), and this require-
ment was conveyed to Mr. Margetts (R. 346). The 
services of KM Design were contracted for the pur-
pose of drawing a complete set of plans (R. 167, 334). 
During his meetings with Dr. Quagliana, Margetts re-
ferred the names of general contractors engaged in 
home construction, including the name of defendant 
Exquisite Home Builders, Inc. (R. 167). 
The Quaglianas immediately commenced a search 
for a lot upon which to construct the home (R. 167). 
At about this same time, Dr. Quagliana contacted 
Philip Marstella, an employee of Exquisite (R. 167). 
Since Marstella was also a licensed real estate broker 
(R. 278), he brought to Dr. Quagliana's attention a 
lot which was for sale and looked at other lots which 
were found by Dr. Quagliana (R. 279). Dr. Quagliana 
found the subject lot at 2965 Sherwood Drive and Mar-
stella similarly took a look at that lot (R. 279). At 
that time Dr. Quagliana had no plans in his possession 
(R. 279) and did not own the particular lot on Sher-
wood Drive (R. 279). At that time the lot was not for 
sale and Dr. Quagliana did not know who owned it (R. 
168). 
Similarly, Margetts visited the subject lot in the 
company of Dr. Quagliana (R. 335). At the time Mar-
getts and Dr. Quagliana visited the subject lot, work 
was underway in drawing the plans (R. 336). On that 
3 
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occasion Margetts walked on the lot and showed Dr. 
Quagliana approximately how the house, and particu-
larly the back of the house where the windows were 
located, would sit in relation to the lot (R. 346). At 
this time Margetts and Dr. Quagliana had in their pos-
session the floor plan of Mrs. Quagliana's father (R. 
346). Dr. Quagliana specifically inquired concerning 
the view and was told by Mr. Margetts that "there 
would be a view" (R. 346). Margetts also expressed 
his opinion that the lot "was a good lot" (R. 336). Be-
fore the lot was purchased by the Quaglianas, Margetts 
drew at least a preliminary plot plan to see if the house 
would fit on the lot (R. 187, 359). 
The Quaglianas were successful in purchasing the 
property on Sherwood Drive (R. 170). KM Design 
then continued the drafting of a complete set of plans, 
including a plot plan showing the location of the house 
on the property (R. 170). In the process of drafting 
the plot plan, Margetts consulted Salt Lake City with 
respdct to the setbacks (R. 288, 340, 352, 356), but 
did not consult with the St. Mary's Hills Architectural 
Supervising Committee (R, 352). Mr. Margetts also 
checked the plot plan to see that it had been drawn as 
represented to Dr. Quagliana when on the subject lot 
(R. 347), and the house was finally plotted as earlier 
described by Margetts to Dr. Quagliana that it would 
be (R. 348). The entire set of plans was completed 
and delivered to Dr. Quagliana in July, 1971 (R. 337, 
338, Ex. 1-P). Those plans showed a 20-foot setback 
4 
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between the garage and the front."property line (R. 186, 
Ex. 1-P). 
On October 7, 1971, a building contract was 
entered into between plaintiffs and defendant Ex-
quisite (R. 280, Ex . 2-P). This building contract re-
sulted from the submission of a bid by Exquisite (R. 
280). In turn, the plans and specifications (Ex. 1-P) 
having been delivered by Dr. Quagliana (R. 279), were 
utilized in computing the bid (R. 280). 
The general building contract (Ex. 2-P) was 
drawn by Prudential Federal Savings as a requisite to 
its loan of money to plaintiffs (R. 254). Exquisite took 
no part in drafting the contract, did not requiest of Pru-
dential Federal Savings that it draft the contract, and 
did not have any relationship with Prudential Federal 
Savings regarding draftsmanship (R. 254, 281). 
The contract (Ex. 2-P) contained a clause incorp-
orating therein the plans and specifications (Ex. 1-P). 
Construction commenced shortly after the contract 
was signed (R. 172). Marstella of Exquisite obtained 
a building permit for the construction of the house at 
2965 Sherwood Drive on October 14, 1971 (R. 281, Ex. 
7-DE). At the time of obtaining the building permit, 
Marstella submitted a copy of the plans as drawn by 
KM Design and as furnished by plaintiffs to Salt Lake 
City (R. 281). At the time of issuing the building per-
mit, a representative of Salt Lake City crossed out the 
5 
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reference to 20 feet and inserted the word "average" (R. 
298). A change of all setbacks to "average" is common 
practice for Salt Lake City (R. 300). 
On approximately October 14, 1971, Marstella of 
Exquisite met on the construction site with personnel of < 
Gardner Engineering and delivered to them a copy of 
the plot plan as drawn by KM Design (R. 282). Per- ' 
sonnel of Gardner Engineering then staked out the lot, 
and this they did in accordance to the plot plan drawn < 
by KM Design (R. 282). Excavation was commenced , 
by Terry Fuller Excavating shortly after October 14, 
1975 (R. 283), and this excavation was completed ac- 1 
cording to the original plot plan (R. 317). 
Several days later, after Exquisite had started 
framing and excavating for the footings themselves (R. 
283), Dr. Quagliana visited the construction site (R. 
172, 283). Dr. Quagliana immediately became con-
cerned that the house was not oriented exactly the way 
Margetts mentioned it would be with the back of the 
home facing the valley (R. 172). Dr. Quagliana ex-
pressed his concern as to the orientation of the house 
to Mr. Marstella who was at the job site (R. 172, 283). 
Dr. Quagliana next called KM Design and told Mar-
getts that he didn't like the way the house was sitting on 
the lot (R. 351). Within a day or two (R. 351), Mar-
getts and Kruckenberg visited the excavation and 
could see nothing wrong with the house as positioned 
on the property at that point (R. 348). Marstella also 
called Margetts and advised that Dr. Quagliana didn't 
6 
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like the position of the house on the lot (R. 351). Mar-
getts declined to draw a new plot plan since he had not 
been paid for his work (R. 351). Ultimately, Dr. Quag-
liana directed Marstella to rotate the home so that the 
back of it would face the valley (R. 184). In arriving 
at this decision, Dr. Quagliana had discussed the need 
for a space for the possible addition of a swimming pool 
and also the possibility of an immediate change in the 
floor plan (R. 283). Dr. Quagliana also advised Mr. 
Marstella of his intention to pay for the additional work 
in altering the orientation of the home (R. 284); A new 
plot plan was drawn by Gardner Engineering showing 
a 20-foot setback on the garage corner (R. 284, Ex. 
5-P.). Although there was conflict in the testimony, 
Dr. Quagliana testified that Margetts of KM Design 
approved the new plot and even voiced some enthusiasm 
for it (R. 174, 175). As before, the new plot plan was 
submitted to Salt Lake City (R. 284). 
The lot was re-staked by Gardner Engineering (R. 
284) and was re-excavated by Terry Fuller Excavating 
(R. 285). The second excavation was completed in ac-
cordance with the second plot plan (R. 186). The foot-
ings were poured on November 12, 1971, and the 
foundation was poured on December 7, 1971 (R. 285). 
Both the footings and the forms for the foundation 
were inspected and approved by Salt Lake City, the 
latter inspection occurring on December 6, 1971 (R. 
286,Ex. 6-DE). 
During the course of construction, Dr. Quagliana 
7 
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received a call from some person living in the area who 
advised him that the plans had never been reviewed bv 
*he St. Mary's Hills Architectural Supervising Com-
mittee (R. 175). Dr. Quagliana immediately requested i 
of Mr. Marstella that he submit the plans to Mr. Elmer 
Davis of the committee (R. 176, 286). This request 1 
came from Dr. Quagliana at about the same time the i 
foundations were poured (R. 287). Marstella delivered 
a set of plans as requested, and thereafter received a 
letter from the St. Mary's Hills Architectural Super- ' 
vising Committee (R. 287, Ex. 12-P). That letter ad- I 
vised that the plans did not conform to certain restric-
tive covenants in three respects: The roof pitch, which 
was 4 to 12, could not exceed 3 % to 12; a topographic 
plan was required; and the setback of 20 feet from the 
front property line to the garage was less than the 
minimum of 30-f eet (Ex. 12-P). 
. I 
i 
Subsequent to the letter from the St. Mary's Hills 1 
Architectural Supervising Committee, Marstella and 
Southam of Exquisite met Dr. Quagliana at the Uni- ] 
versity of Utah Hospital (R. 288). At that meeting J 
Dr. Quagliana expressed his growing dissatisfaction l 
with the neighbors and neighborhood and expressed his { 
belief that KM Design had checked out the items of 
which the architectural committee was complaining (R. 
289). At that meeting Dr. Quagliana expressed his 
intention to speak personally to the members of the j 
St. Mary's Hills Architectural Supervising Commit-
tee (R. 288). 
8 
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On January 3, 1972, Dr. Quagliana instructed 
officers of Prudential Federal Savings that they should 
not disburse any further funds to Exquisite or its sub-
contractors (R. 189, 256, Ex. 13-DE). (Under the 
general building contract, Exhibit 2-P, progress pay-
ments were to be made upon application of the con-
tractor in order to finance the construction of the dwel-
ling house.) When Exquisite called Prudential for an 
inspection preparatory to sending in a draw, they were 
advised that a hold had been placed on all funds and 
that it would be useless to request a draw (R. 289, 
330). 
On January 4, 1972, Marstella and Southam of 
Exquisite and Dr. Quagliana met with Dr. Quagliana's 
attorney (R. 178, 290, 317). At that meeting Mr. 
Southam (President of Exquisite) indicated his will-
ingness to proceed with construction as directed by Dr. 
Quagliana and to stand the expense of tearing out the 
foundation and starting over again (R. 318). Several 
proposals or alternatives were discussed (R. 180, 290, 
318). Among those alternatives was a proposal to re-
duce the size of the garage, a proposal to tear out the 
total construction and start over again with the mirror 
image of the same floor plan, and a proposal to pur-
chase the lot and partially completed structure for the 
purpose of re-selling on speculation (R. 180, 290, 318). 
(The testimony was that the original floor plan would 
physically fit upon the subject lot with a 30-foot set-
back, but that the view would have been similar to that 
of the original plot plan (R. 319, 291)). The meeting 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
concluded when Dr. Quagliana or his attorney advised 
that the proposals would be considered and that Ex-
quisite would be advised of Dr. Quagliana's wishes (R. 
293, 320). Nothing was then heard from Dr. Quag-
liana or his attorney until about February 23, 1972 (R. 
293, 321). By letter of that date, Dr. Quagliana ad-
vised Exquisite of the price he would accept for sale 
of the lot and partially completed home (Ex. 15-DE). 
After some investigation, it was determined by Ex-
quisite that it would not be feasible to purchase the 
lot and foundation at the price asked by Dr. Quagliana 
(R. 294, 321). Thereafter, Dr. Quagliana was advised 
by Marstella that his asking price made it more feasible 
to tear out the foundation and relocate the house (R. 
295, Ex. 3-DE). At that time Mr. Marstella advised 
Dr. Quagliana, through his attorney, that Exquisite 
stood ready to tear out the foundation and relocate the 
house (R. 295, Ex. 3-DE). 
While awaiting direction from Dr. Quagliana as to 
where he wanted the home located or what modifications 
he desired in the floor plan, Exquisite proceeded with 
plans for removal of the foundation (R. 321). During 
this same general time period, Southam of Exquisite 
contacted Terry Fuller of Terry Fuller Excavating 
and discussed with him the method to be used in re-
moving the foundation and disposing of the concrete 
(R. 321, 326). Specifically, Southam asked Fuller if 
he would locate a place where the broken concrete could 
be dumped (R. 321, 326). Fuller proceeded with this 
investigation and found a place in North Salt Lake 
10 
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where the broken concrete could be dumped (R. 326). 
Exquisite received no further communication from 
Dr. Quagliana indicating his wishes with respect to the 
location of the home (R. 295, 321). However, Ex-
quisite did receive from plaintiffs through their attorney 
a letter dated March 9, 1972 (Ex. 16-DE). By that 
letter, Exquisite was advised that the Quaglianas did 
not wish to proceed further with construction of the 
home and considered themselves excused from further 
performance under the contract of October 7,1971 (Ex. 
16-DE). In response to that letter, Exquisite ad-
dressed a letter of March 15, 1972, to the Quagliana's 
attorney reminding him that Exquisite had, at all times, 
remained ready, willing and able to tear out the found-
ation and relocate the house as directed by Dr. Quag-
liana (Ex. 3-DE). 
Prudential Federal Savings advanced the sum of 
$2,069.79 to Exquisite and its subcontractors to cover 
the cost of construction (R. 328). The further sum of 
$1,577.73 was paid to various subcontractors by Ex-
quisite but was not reimbursed by plaintiffs or Pru-
dential (R.330). 
The Quaglianas sold the subject lot to Gale and 
Joyce Smith on December 13, 1972, for the sum of 
$23,750.00 (R. 266). The Smiths planned to and did 
utilize the excavation and most of the foundation in 
constructing a home (R. 266, 267). The subject lot 
had been purchased by the Quaglianas for $20,485.00 
(R. 266). 
11 
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A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E F I N D I N G S O F F A C T A R E SUP- | 
P O R T E D B Y T H E E V I D E N C E A N D T H E j 
COURT M A D E F I N D I N G S O F F A C T ON A L L ' 
M A T E R I A L I S S U E S I N C O M P L I A N C E 
W I T H R U L E 52 O F T H E R U L E S O F C I V I L 
P R O C E D U R E . f 
This is a case at law. That being so, it is not the 
duty of the Supreme Court to weigh evidence, and any 
substantial evidence will support the Findings and Jud-
 ( 
tnent. Osborn v. Peters, 69 Utah 391, 255 Pac. 435 i 
(1927); and Cannon v. Wright, No. 13746, Feb. 13, ; 
1975. In Parrish v. Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P . j 
2d 642, 644 (1957), this Court held that it should mere-
ly review the evidence to ascertain whether the record ! 
showed some competent evidence. This Court further , 
stated that the evidence should be viewed in a light \ 
most favorable to the Findings: i 
ii 
" Since the court made findings and entered , 
judgment based thereon, it is our duty to review ' 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the find-
ings. In reciting the facts, therefore, we state 
them as found by the trial court so long as the 
record shows some competent evidence from 
which such findings could derive." 
Such a review of evidence will show that the Find-
ings of the court are supported by substantial evidence 
12 
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and that Findings were made on all material issues. 
Complaint is made on appeal that Finding No. 17 (R. 
18) and Finding No. 31 (R. 20) are not supported by 
the evidence. 
Finding No. 17 relates to the modification of the 
original plot plan by rotating the home so as to pro-
vide a direct view of the Salt Lake Valley. The record 
reveals that Dr. Quagliana became unhappy with the 
orientation of the house after viewing the open excava-
tion (R. 172). Dr. Quagliana brought this dissatisfac-
tion to the attention of KM Design and Exquisite (R. 
172, 351), and directed that the house be rotated so 
that the back of it would face the valley (R. 184). In 
so directing, Dr. Quagliana advised Exquisite of his 
intention to pay for the additional work in altering 
the orientation of the home (R. 284). Exquisite acceded 
to the wishes of Dr. Quagliana and the result was a 
modification of the original plan to which the parties 
agreed (R. 186, 200). As a portion of the evidence 
supporting Finding No. 17, the Record shows the fol-
lowing exchange (R.184): 
"Q. Whose idea was it to modify the original plot 
plan? 
"A. As in the final plans? 
Q. Yes, the original plot plan drawn by KM. 
Whose idea was it to modify it? „ 
A. Mine. I t was my idea. 
Q. Did you direct Mr. Marstella as to—precisely 
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as to where that house should be positioned? 
A. Not in detail. Only in generalities, in that I 
thought it should be turned so that the back of it could 
face the valley." 
Finding No. 31 is concerned with proposals made 
by Exquisite after the 30-foot setback requirement had 
been discovered and with the readiness and willingness 
of Exquisite to remedy the problem at its own expense. 
Three parties, Dr. Quagliana, Marstella and Southam, 
testified concerning the proposals or alternatives dis-
cussed on January 4, 1972 (R. 179, 290, 318). This 
testimony clearly shows that Exquisite remained ready, 
willing and able, at its own expense, to tear out the 
foundation and start construction anew. The Record 
reveals that Exquisite made arrangements with Terry 
Fuller Excavating to tear out the concrete and remove 
the same to North Salt Lake (R. 321, 326). The 
record will show that Exquisite had a preference for 
the alternative of purchasing the lot and foundation 
and, after completing the home, selling on the specula-
tive market. This alternative would have presented the 
prospect of enhanced profits to Exquisite. However, 
the price asked by Dr. Quagliana was so excessive that 
it was not feasible to purchase the lot on speculation 
(R. 294, 321). Marstella advised plaintiffs that their 
asking price was excessive and that Exquisite would 
tear out the foundation and relocate the home (R. 295, 
Ex. 3-DE). However, Exquisite could not proceed 
until the plaintiffs advised where they wanted the house 
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located or in what respect they wanted the floor plan 
to be changed. That information was never forthcoming 
from the plaintiffs (R. 205, 321). The transcript re-
veals the following testimony from Glade Southam, 
president of Exquisite (R. 318, 319): 
"Q. Do you recall any proposals being made by 
either Dr. Quagliana or Exquisite Homes on that occa-
sion? 
A. Yes. One proposal was tearing out the found-
ation and flopping the house plan over. Another pro-
posal was to cut the garage off on an angle and to get 
the 30-foot setback. Another one was to cut the garage 
off straight across and the other was taking—purchas-
ing the lot from the doctor and we continue the house 
ourself. 
Q. And who made those proposals ? 
A. Exquisite Homes did. We did. 
Q. Did you personally make those proposals? 
A. Yes. 
Q. (By Mr. Harrison) Did you advise Dr. Quag-
liana that you were willing to take the expense of tear-
ing out the foundation and starting over ? 
MR. R O E : That is leading and I object. 
T H E COURT: Yeah, a little bit but overrule. 
He may answer. 
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T H E W I T N E S S : At the meeting on January 
4th, i t was indicated that we would stand the cost of 
whichever way we went,, of tearing out the foundation 
or cutting the garage off or what method we did go." 
Plaintiffs also complain of Finding No. 33, but 
admit that it is supported by some evidence. Evidence 
in support of that Finding clearly appears on page 
295 of the Record and in Exhibit 3-DE. Plaintiffs' 
concern seems to have arisen in retrospect by its own 
failure to counter the testimony of defendants' two 
witnesses. During the course of plaintiffs' rebuttal case, 
an objection was raised by the attorney for KM De-
sign on the basis that the questioning of the plaintiff 
was repetitious. In fact, Dr. Quagliana had previously, 
during plaintiffs' case in chief, been questioned con-
cerning these same facts (R. 180, 181, 182, 198). The 
Record will show that substantially the same question 
was put to Dr. Quagliana during the presentation of 
the plaintiffs' case in chief (R. 182). Following cer-
tain comments on the evidence, plaintiffs' counsel vol-
untarily elected not to pursue that line of questioning. 
Plaintiffs' counsel clearly had an opportunity to put 
further questions to his witness, but elected not to do so. 
The reluctance of counsel to pursue that line of ques-
tioning is understandable, since he himself was a par-
ticipant (R. 163, 294). Plaintiffs' counsel was reluct-
ant to proceed in depth into those facts since to do so 
would have required that counsel take the witness stand 
and withdraw from the argument of the case. And the 
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Court had previously instructed counsel as to the con-
sequences of his taking the witness stand (R. 163). 
Finally, error is claimed with regard to a com-
parison of the actual setback with that of the Salt Lake 
City Zoning Ordinances and the restricive covenants 
of the subdivision. The evidence will not support a 
finding that the ordinances of Salt Lake City were 
violated. The Record will disclose that Salt Lake City 
did place a stop work order upon the project, but this 
was done at the instance of the St. Mary's Hills Archi-
tectural Supervising Committee. In any event, work 
had already stopped since the 30-foot setback require-
ment of the St. Mary's Hills Subdivision had become 
known. With respect to the 30-foot setback require-
ment of the subdivision, Exquisite never contested the 
facts which showed a violation of that requirement. 
The Court did make Findings that the foundation 
was constructed with a 20-foot setback between the 
garage and the front property line and that the St. 
Mary's Hills Architectural Supervising Committee re-
quired a 30-foot setback. Findings No. 13 and 14 indi-
cate that the lot was originally staked and excavated 
with a 20-foot setback. Finding No. 27 states that he 
re-staking conformed to the amended plot plan as drawn 
but not as amended by the word "average". Similarly, 
Finding No. 24 indicates that the excavation was ac-
complished in accordance with the amended plot plan. 
Finding No. 26 expressly states that the foundation was 
constructed with a "20-foot setback". Finding No. 27 
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expressly states that the St. Mary's Hills Architectural 
Supervising Committee "required a 30-foot front set-
back". Finally, Finding No. 28 states that approval 
was never received from the St. Mary's Hill Archi-
tectural Supervising Committee. 
In any event, the Finding requested by plaintiffs 
is properly categorized as a conclusion of law. The 
Findings of the Court clearly show that the foundation 
was constructed with a 20-foot setback and that the sub-
division requirements were for a 30-foot setback. 
Whether this is a violation, which it obviously is, re-
quires the application of principles of law. 
P O I N T I I 
AS A M A T T E R OF CONTRACT I N T E R -
P R E T A T I O N , E X Q U I S I T E H O M E B U I L D -
E R S , INC. C O M P L I E D W I T H T H E GEN-
E R A L B U I L D I N G CONTRACT A N D T H E 
P L A N S A N D S P E C I F I C A T I O N S INCORPOR-
A T E D T H E R E I N . 
The plans an dspecifications (Ex. 1-P) were made 
a part of the contract by the reference contained in 
paragraph No. 1 of the General Building Contract 
(Ex. 2-P). The plans, in turn, consisted of eight de-
tailed drawings and a plot plan (Ex. 1-P). Specific-
ally, the General Building Contract stated that the 
dwelling house should be constructed ". . . in strict ac-
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cordance with this contract, the plans and specifications 
hereunto attached and made a part hereof and identi-
fied by the signatures of the parties hereto and in strict 
compliance with all apphcable laws, ordinances and 
other governmental regulations affecting such construc-
tion." (Ex. 2-P). 
The General Building Contract was executed by 
plaintiffs and Exquisite subsequent to the purchase of 
the subject lot on Sherwood Drive (R. 199). Similarly, 
the plans were drawn by KM Design prior to the ex-
ecution of the contract (R. 337, Ex. 2-P). In drawing 
those plans, KM Design had shown, on the plot plan, 
the position of the structure in relationship to the prop-
erty lines by the use of four separate dimensions (Ex. 
1-P). In drawing that plot plan, KM Design assumed 
the responsibility for the location of the home and at-
tempted to satisfy that obligation by contacting offic-
ials of Salt Lake City (R. 288, 340, 352, 356). How-
ever, KM Design did not check on restrictive covenants 
(R. 352). Upon cross examination, Mr. Margetts of 
KM Design admitted that he felt some obligation to 
contact Salt Lake City with regard to the setback re-
quirements but that he did not contact any subdivision 
committee because he thought the plot plan was satis-
factory (R. 356): 
"Q. Mr. Margetts, I understand that you checked 
the setback requirements of this particular house and lot 
with Salt Lake City; is that correct ? . ' . ' • 
A. Yes. . 
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Q. And why did you check that setback require-
ment with Salt Lake City? 
A. That is the first thing we do on a house, to 
find out how big a house you can put on it. You cer-
tainly don't want to design a house and find out it is 
too big for the property. I t is just standard procedure 
in our office. That is one of the first things you do. 
Q. Did you feel some obligation to check those set-
back requirements ? 
A. No, I didn't because I thought we were plenty 
fine with the 20 and 30, in my conversation with the 
City. 
Q. But you felt some obligation to contact Salt 
Lake City? 
A. Yes, I contacted them. 
Both Dr. Quagliana and Marstella of Exquisite 
testified that they relied upon the plans and specifica-
tions drawn by KM Design (R. 186, 279). Specific-
ally, Marstella testified that he used the plans and spec-
ifications (Ex. 1-P) in making a bid (B. 279, 280). 
The plans and specifications were furnished to Ex-
quisite by plaintiffs (R. 279). 
This Court has previously held that when a con-
tract refers to plans and specifications, the same are 
incorporated into and become a part of the contract. In 
Utah Lumber Co. v. James, 25 Utah 434, 71 Pac. 986, 
987 (1903), this Court held that plans, specifications 
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and detailed drawings which were referred to in the 
contract ". . . became a part of the contract, equally 
binding as the proposal itself." 
In this particular case, the plot plan, and conse-
quently the contract, required that the house be located 
with a 20-foot setback between the garage and the 
front property line (Ex. 1-P). Dr. Quagliana ad-
mitted that the initial excavation was made in accord-
ance with the original plot plan as drawn by KM De-
sign and that the subsequent excavation was made in 
accordance with the modified plot plan (R. 185, 186) : 
"Q. Was the initial excavation made in accord-
ance with the original plot plan designed by K.M.? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. And the subsequent excavation was done in 
accordance to your instructions; is that correct? 
A. Well, it was done in accordance with a decision 
made by all three of us. I t was not—I did not say, 
"This is the way it will be and this is the way I want 
you to do it." We decided to make a change with the 
approval of Mr. Marstella and Mr. Margetts and my-
self. 
Q. I t was your idea to make that change ? 
A. Yes, it was. . ,• 
However, the plans and specifications, and particularly 
the plot plan, turned out to be defective. The testi-
mony adequately established the requirement of a 30-
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foot setback as imposed by the St. Mary's Hills Archi-
tectural Supervising Committee (R. 241). 
Numerous cases can be found for the proposition 
that a construction contractor who has followed plans 
and specifications furnished by the owner, and which 
have proved to be defective, will not be responsible for 
the loss which results. In Bradford Builders, Inc. v. 
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 270 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1959), 
the fencing subcontractor was furnished a plot plan by 
the general contractor. That plot plan showed the lo-
cation where a fence was to be installed. The fencing 
subcontractor installed the fence at the location shown 
on the plot plan. The Court there held that since the 
subcontractor was bound to build according to plans 
and specifications, the subcontractor would not be held 
responsible for the consequences of defects in those 
plans and specifications. In Kelly v. Bank Building 
and Equipment Corp. of America, 453 F . 2d 774 (10th 
Cir. 1972), the building owner brought suit against the 
contractor for improper installation of a curtain wall. 
The trial court there found that the design of the cur-
tain wall was deficient and that the curtain wall had 
been installed pursuant to the plans and specifications. 
In affirming for the contractor the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the owner's architect im-
pliedly warranted the sufficiency of the overall con-
struction plan and that this warranty was paramount 
and controlling over any guarantee of completion by 
the contractor. In Puget Sound National Bank of 
Tacoma v. C. B. Lauch Const. Co., 73 Idaho 68, 245 
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P. 2d 800, 805 (1952), the painting was shown by F H A 
to be unsatisfactory. However, the evidence sustained 
a finding that the painting had been accomplished in 
conformity with plans and specifications which had 
been incorporated into the contract by reference. In 
affirming for the painting contractor the Idaho Su-
preme Court stated: 
"A contractor is required to follow the plans and 
specifications and when he does so, he cannot be 
held to guarantee that the work performed as 
required by his contract will be free from de-
fects, or withstand the action of the elements, or 
that the completed job will accomplish the pur-
pose intended. He is only responsible for im-
proper workmanship or other faults, or defects 
resulting from his failure to perform." 
The leading case in this respect is United States 
v. Spectrin, 248 U.S. 132, 137, 63 L. Ed. 166, 39 S. 
Ct. 59 (1918). In that case Spearin contracted to 
build a dry dock at the Brooklyn Naval Yard in ac-
cordance with plans and specifications which had been 
prepared by the government. Other contract provisions 
required the contractor to examine the site for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the actual conditions, to check the 
plans, dimensions and elevations, and to stand respons-
ible for the work until completion. The site was inter-
sected by a 6-foot brick sewer which was required to be 
relocated. The plans and specifications provided that 
the contractor should do the work and prescribed the 
dimensions, material, and location of the sewer section 
to be substituted. All the prescribed requirements were 
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fully complied with by Speann. Speaking through 
Justice Brandeis, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed for the contractor: 
". . . But the insertion of the articles prescribing 
the character, dimensions and location of the 
sewer imported a warranty that, if the specifica-
tions were complied with, the sewer would be 
adequate. This implied warranty is not overcome 
by the general clauses requiring the contractor, 
to examine the site, to check up the plans, and 
to assume responsibility for the work until com-
pletion and acceptance. The obligation to exam-
ine the site did not impose upon him the duty of 
making a diligent enquiry into the history of 
the locality with a view to determining, at his 
peril, whether the sewer specifically prescribed 
by the Government would prove adquate. The 
duty to check plans did not impose the obligation 
to pass upon their adequacy to accomplish the 
purpose in view. And the provision concerning 
contractor's responsibility cannot be construed 
as abridging rights arising under specific pro-
visions of the contract." 
The rule announced by these cases, that the owner 
is responsible for defects in plans and specifications, has 
become well settled in practically every American juris-
diction. 13 Am. Ju r 2d, Building and Construction 
Contracts, Sec .28. 
The Spearin case suggests that the plans and spec-
ifications, being more specific, must control over more 
general language. This would appear to be a specific 
application of the standard given in Restatement, Con-
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tracts, Section 236 (c), and adopted in Waterway 
Terminals Co. v. P.S. Lord Mechanical Contractors^ 
242 Oregon 1, 406 P . 2d 556, 13 A.L.R. 3d 1 (1965). 
Those authorities indicate that a specific provision will 
ordinarily qualify the meaning of a more general pro-
vision. 
In this particular case, the plot plan showed pre-
cisely where the building was to fit upon the lot. This 
was accomplished by giving four dimensions from vari-
ous points on the structure to various points on the 
property lines (Ex. 1-P). I t is not conceivable that 
the position of that home could have been given more 
specifically. Any other location would have changed 
those dimensions and completely nullified the entire 
plot plan. 
The plaintiffs in this case have complained as to 
this defendant's interpretation of the contract and as 
to the position where the foundation was ultimately 
constructed. However, the plaintiffs have never in-
dicated where their interpretation of the contract would 
place the structure. The undisputed testimony in this 
case was that the house would physically fit on the 
subject lot with appropriate 30-foot setbacks (R. 291, 
319). However, the satisfaction of two 30-foot set-
back requirements would have oriented the house so 
that a direct view of the Salt Lake Valley would not 
have been presented (JR. 292). The Record is replete 
with references to the view as being very important to 
the plaintiffs (R. 185, 188, 283). Even after Exquisite 
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agreed to tear out the foundation and start construction 
anew, at its own expense, the plaintiffs never could or 
did decide where the home should be positioned upon 
the lot. 
This Court has, on many occasions, adopted the 
rule of construction that the proper interpretation of a 
contract is the interpretation placed upon it by the 
parties through their acts and conduct. Roberts v. 
Tuttle, 36 Utah 614, 105 Pac. 916 (1909); Trucker 
Sales Corp. v. Potter, 104 Utah 1, 137 P . 2d 370 
(1943); and Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d 
320, 266 P.2d 494 (1954). I t is interesting to note in 
this respect what Dr. Quagliana stated regarding the 
contractual right of Exquisite to position the home 
otherwise than as shown on the plot plan: 
"Q. (By Mr. Harrison) Was Exquisite Home 
Builders at liberty to alter the position of that home as 
shown on the original plot plan ? 
A. No. This question had never arisen. (R. 197) 
This Court has decided many cases under the rule 
of interpretation that a contract must be construed most 
strongly against the party responsible for the draftsman-
ship. Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P . 
2d 1007 (1972) ; Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323, 
400 P . 2d 503 (1965); Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 
196, 450 P . 2d 467 (1969); Skousen v. Smith, 27 Utah 
2d 169, 493 P . 2d 1003 (1972) ; Penn Star Mining Co. 
v. Lyman, 64 Utah 343, 231 Pac. 107 (1924); and 
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Mifflin v. Shiki, 77 Utah 190, 293 Pac. 1 (1930). 
The record clearly shows that the subject contract 
was drawn by an agent of plaintiffs (R. 254, 281). 
P O I N T I I I 
A G R E E M E N T OF T H E P A R T I E S U P O N 
A SECOND P L O T P L A N R E S U L T E D I N A 
M O D I F I E D CONTRACT W H I C H SUPER-
S E D E D T H E F I R S T TO T H E E X T E N T OF 
A N Y I N C O N S I S T E N C I E S . 
The general building contract contained a para-
graph requiring any changes in the terms of the con-
tract or the plans and specifications to be in writing 
(Ex. 2-P). This Court has held on several occasions 
that the parties to a written contract may modify, waive 
or make new terms notwithstanding such language. 
Davis v. Payne § Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P . 2d 
337 (1960) ; Wilson v. Gardner, 10 Utah 2d 89, 348 P . 
2d 931 (1960); Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co., 106 
Utah 166, 146 P. 2d 284 (1944) ; Rhodes v. Clute, 17 
Utah 137, 53 Pac. 990 (1898); and PLC Landscape 
Construction v. Piccadilly Fish'N Chips, Inc., 28 Utah 
2d 350,502 P.2d 562 (1972). 
These expressions of the Utah Supreme Court are 
consistent with the general rule as found in 17A C.J.S., 
Contracts, Section 377 (c), and 13 Am; Jur.2d, Build-
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ing and Construction Contract*, Section 14. The latte^ 
states the rule this way: 
"Although stipulations in building or construc-
tion contracts requiring written orders or agree-
ments for extra work or alterations are valid and 
binding so long as they remain in effect, it is 
equally well settled that they may be avoided by 
the parties to the contract. The courts have 
adopted various theories of avoidance, which may 
be classified as those of independent contract, 
modification or recission, waiver, and estoppel. 
"A waiver of such stipulation by the owner is 
the theory on which it is most frequently avoided. 
Among the acts or conduct amounting to waiver 
are the owner's knowledge of, agreement to, or 
acquiesence in, such extra work, a course of deal-
ing which repeatedly disregards such stipulation, 
and a promise to pay for extra work, orally re-
quested by the owner and performed in reliance 
on that promise." 
The evidence in this case clearly shows that Dr. 
Quagliana, after becoming dissatisfied with the view, 
originated the idea to modify the original plot plan (R. 
184). Dr. Quagliana then directed Mr. Marstella to 
position the home "so that the back of it could face 
the valley" (R. 184). At that time Dr. Quagliana ad-
vised Exquisite that he would pay for the contract 
change (R. 284). Dr. Quagliana himself testified that 
the second excavation was done ". . . in accordance with 
a decision made by all three of us . . ." (R. 186). Dr. 
Quagliana expressly stated that the original plan and 
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specifications, which were a part of the contract, had 
been modified (R. 200): 
"Q. But you modified those original plans and 
specifications, did you not? 
A. Yes.'' 
As noted, Dr. Quagliana directed Exquisite to 
rotate the house so that the back of it could face the 
valley (R. 184). This is clearly inconsistent with the 
language of the general building contract (Ex. 2-P) 
which authorized the contractor to locate the building 
upon the site. In fact, Dr. Quagliana specifically testi-
fied that Exquisite was not at liberty to alter the posi-
tion of the home (R. 197). This direction to locate the 
home so that the back of it could face the valley is 
clearly inconsistent with the positioning of that home 
so that the back of it would face the mountains and 
neighboring houses. This latter view was the only one 
available if the 30-foot set back requirement was to be 
met (R. 292, 320). 
I t is a well established principle of law that a 
second agreement will govern over inconsistent terms 
of an earlier contract between the same parties. Re-
statement, Contracts, Section 408. That principle was 
adopted by this Court in the case of Mawhinney v. Jen-
sen, 120 Utah 142, 232 P.2d 769 (1951). A general 
statement of that principle is found in 17A C.J.S., 
Contracts, Section 379: 
"An agreement, when changed by the mutual 
consent of the parties, becomes a new agreement, 
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which takes the place of the old and determines 
the rights of the parties thereto. In such case, 
the agreement between the parties consists of the 
new terms and as much of the old agreement as 
the parties have agreed shall remain unchanged, 
in other words, a contract may be abrogated in 
part and stand as to the residue and the new 
contract supersedes the first to the extent that 
the two will be unable to stand together" (Italics 
added) 
Principles of contract modifications are clearly ap-
plicable to building and construction contracts where 
the modification sometimes results from express or im-
plied waiver. 
"The foregoing rules, as to alteration or modifi-
cation of contracts by mutual consent, have been 
applied to building and construction contracts. 
Thus the contractor and the owner may, by sub-
sequent agreement, modify the original contract 
and authorize or require deviations and depart-
ures therefrom; and the new agreement either ex-
pressly or impliedly may waive any right either 
would otherwise have had; . . ." 17A C.J.S., 
Contracts, Section 373 (b) 
These principles have found application in the 
case of Driver-Miller Plumbing, Inc. v. Fromm, 72 
N. M. 117, 381 P . 2d 53 (1963). That case involved a 
suit brought by a heating subcontractor against the 
owner-general contractor of a home. The owner-general 
contractor defended on the basis that the heating sys-
tem failed to heat satisfactorily. The evidence there 
showed that the owner-general contractor obtained the 
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specifications and gave them to the heating subcon-
tractor. Also, the owner-general contractor gave the 
heating subcontractor directions with reference to devi-
ations from the specifications. On the basis of those 
facts, the Court stated its holding on page 54: 
"The court found, and the finding is amply sup-
ported by adequate proof under the most strin-
gent requirements, that the installation was made 
by plaintiff in accordance with instructions from 
Melvin B. Fromm, the general contractor, and 
with his knowledged and acquiescence. Accord-
ingly, no complaint can be made that plaintiff 
failed to comply strictly with the original speci-
fications." 
P O I N T IV 
P L A I N T I F F S W R O N G F U L L Y R E S C I N D -
E D T H E CONTRACT W H I L E E X Q U I S I T E 
H O M E B U I L D E R S , INC., R E M A I N E D 
R E A D Y , W I L L I N G A N D A B L E TO COM-
P L E T E T H E CONTRACT W I T H I N T H E 
T I M E P R O V I D E D . 
The plaintiffs' letter of March 9, 1972, terminat-
ing the right of Exquisite to proceed under the con-
tract (Ex. 16-DE) and plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 141) 
were both predicated upon a total breach by failure to 
situate the home in accordance with building restric-
t ion and inability to complete the home within the time 
contemplated by the contract. The contract did require 
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completion of the dwelling within 180 days from the 
date of commencement (Ex.-2P). Commencement was 
not required until ten days after funds were deposited I 
with Prudential Federal Savings in the construction 
trust fund account (Ex. 2-P). Mr. Roof of Prudential 
Federal Savings testified that funds were deposited 
into the construction trust fund account on November 
26, 1971 (R. 250, 253). The elapse of 180 days would 
have placed the completion date on approximately j 
April 26, 1972. However, the general building con- j 
tract, in paragraph No. 5, provided an extension of j 
time for changes and unusual delays beyond the con- j 
trol of the contractor, and the Record discloses that the ] 
rotation of the home and poor weather, alone, caused j 
a five week delay (Ex. 3-DE). Furthermore, the con- j 
tract, paragraph number 6, provided a penalty for de- J 
lay of $12.92 per day as liquidated damages. j 
I t should require no citation of authority to estab- j 
lish that an owner cannot anticipate the default of the J 
contractor and, on that basis, terminate the contract. J 
This is particularly so, when the contract provides for I 
liquidated damages in the event of a delay in comple- I 
tion. 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Building and Construction Con- I 
tracts, Section 47. The plaintiffs' sole remedy for fail- I 
ure to complete the contract within the time specified I 
was the collection or retention of liquidated damages I 
under the contract at the rate of $12.92 per day; the I 
plaintiffs cannot anticipatorily repudiate the contract I 
for failing to complete the home within the time con- I 
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templated by the contract when at least 47 days re-
main before completion is required. 
Our facts are similar in this respect to those in the 
oft-cited case of Brady v. Oliver, 125 Tenn. 595, 147 
S.W. 1135 (1911). That case similarly involved a con-
struction contract where the owner anticipated a fail-
ure to perform at a time prior to the time set for com-
pletion. The court there contrasted that case with those 
where the contractor had abandoned the contract or had 
renounced the contract and refused to proceed under 
it. The Court there held that the disability could not 
be anticipated. Such a factual situation would seem to 
be within the scope of the rule announced in Retate-
ment, Contracts, Section 323. I t should be noted, how-
ever, that that section is premised upon a defective per-
formance. Explanatory comment (c), page 487, reads 
as follows: 
"Frequently a period of time is allowed by a 
contract within which a party thereto may per-
form a promise. In such a case tender of de-
fective performance does not necessarily show 
that if the tender is refused, correct performance 
will not be rendered within the period allowed 
by the contract. Even if performance must be 
on a particular day, it may be possible to remedy 
a defective tender made on that day. . . ." 
The testimony in this case clearly shows that Ex-
quisite remained ready, willing and able to tear out the 
foundation and relocate the house at its own expense. 
This willingness to proceed with construction was com-
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municated to plaintiffs on at least four separate occa-
sions (R. 294, 295, 318, Ex. 3-DE). Exquisite even 
proceeded to the point of contacting a contractor who 
would remove the foundation (R. 321), and locating a 
place in North Salt Lake where the broken concrete 
could be dumped (R. 326). However, Exquisite could 
not proceed further until the plaintiffs advised where 
they wanted the house located or in what respect they 
wanted the floor plan to be changed. The concrete 
foundation could not be removed since some alternatives 
involving a modification of the floor plan contemplated 
utilizing a portion of the foundation. However, plain-
tiffs never authorized Exquisite to continue with the 
construction or advised as to the desired position for the 
home (R. 295, 321). The Record is absolutely devoid 
of any indication that Exquisite was unwilling or un-
able to continue the construction. 
Even if the performance of Exquisite was consid-
ered to be defective, the plaintiffs would have no right 
to repudiate the contract under the facts of this case. 
In order to justify rescission, the breach must go to the 
root of the contract. The act complained of must in-
volve an unqualified refusal to perform and should 
amount to a determination not to be bound by the con-
tract in the future. 17A C.J.S., Contracts, Section 422 
(1). Grounds for rescission or termination of a build-
ing and construction contract is the subject of 17A 
C.J.S., Contracts, Section 422 (2) : 
"The builder's fault is not a ground for rescis-
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sion by the owner, where it is caused by the own-
er's failure to perform, or by the wrongful acts 
or omissions of the owner or his architect or 
engineer. 
"It is not every partial neglect or refusal to 
comply with the terms of the contract by the 
builder which will entitle the owner to rescind, 
but the default must be substantial and of such 
a character as indicates an intention on the part 
of the builder to abandon the contract', there 
must be an actual default, unequivocal renunci-
ation, or legal disability to perform on his 
p a r t . . . . " (Italics added) 
This Court has had occasion to require such an in-
tention on the part of the promisor to abandon the con-
tract before permitting termination or repudiation. In 
Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P . 2d 927 
(1953), a real estate listing agreement required that 
the sale be consummated before a commission was paid. 
The buyer and seller signed an earnest money receipt 
and offer to purchase, but at that point the seller suf-
fered a change of mind and wilfully refused to cooper-
ate. This Court held that, even though the agreement 
required & consummated sale and even though the sale 
was not consummated, the broker was still entitled to 
his commission. The Court found that the buyer re-
mained ready, willing and able to perform and that the 
failure of the transaction to be consummated resulted 
from the arbitrary refusal of the owner to perform his 
part of the transaction. The Court further held that 
the agreement contemplated that the owner would co-
35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
operate in good faith toward the accomplishment of the 
contract purpose. In Haymore v. Levinson, 8 Utah 2d 
66, 328 P . 2d 307 (1958), the builder was obligated to 
complete a list of defects in the construction of a home. 
However, the owner would not allow the builder to pro-
ceed in correcting those defects until other items were 
completed. This Court held that the owner had pre-
vented the builder from further performance and there-
fore could not take advantage of the failure of perform-
ance. 
The case of Parrish v. Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 
318 P.2d 642 (1957), has a factual situation which very 
closely parallels the facts of this case. In that case Tah-
taras engaged the services of architect Parrish to design 
a residence on a lot then owned. Under the terms of the 
agreement, the total cost of the residence could not ex-
ceed $65,000.00, including architect's fees. The archi-
tect prepared sketches, drawing and specifications, but 
the bids ranged from $73,280.00 to $90,000.00. Tah-
taras then directed the architect to make alterations in 
the plans, but all bids were again rejected. Tahtaras 
then notified the architect of his intention to abandon 
the project of constructing a residence. This Court 
held that the architect, having remained ready, willing 
and able to proceed with the modifications after having 
twice before failed, was entitled to collect for his serv-
ices. On page 645, this Court stated: 
«* * *• The defendants abandoned by an unequiv-
ocal act the project after they had told the plain-
tiff to go ahead and modify the plans to come 
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within the cost limitations set, and while plain-
tiff remained ready, willing and able to proceed 
with such modifications for a second time, the 
first modification having been rebid and rejected 
by the defendants. In the case of abandonment 
by the owners of their contract with an architect, 
where the architect is in the process of fulfilling 
the conditions under his contract for services, the 
architect may bring an action for damages on the 
contract, or in the alternative, sue in quasi con-
tract under the theory of quantum meruit. * * *•" 
The conduct of Exquisite in remaining ready, will-
ing and able to reconstruct the home as directed by 
plaintiffs, contrasts sharply with the conduct of plain-
tiffs. Here the plaintiffs simply had a change of mind 
and decided that they did not want to construct that 
particular plan upon that particular lot. In this re-
spect, it must be recognized that the lot had been pur-
chased and the plans drawn considerably prior to the 
contract date of October 7,1971. Because of this change 
of mind, the plaintiffs simply refused to permit Ex-
quisite to proceed with construction. On January 3, 
1972, plaintiffs ordered their agent to pay no further 
installments of the contract price (R. 189, 256, Ex. 13-
D E ) . Then, after great delay, the plaintiffs notified 
Exquisite in writing that they did not wish to proceed 
further with the construction and considered them-
selves excused from further performance. (Ex. 16-
DE) 
The letter of March 9, 1972, is clearly in repudi-
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ation of the entire contract. Similarly, the failure to 
pay an installment of the contract price as provided in 
a building or construction contract gives the contractor 
the right to consider the contract at an end. 13 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Building and Construction Contracts, Section 
102; and Gabriel v. Corkum, 183 Oregon 679, 196 P . 
2d 437 (1948). 
Such an abandonment by the owners of their con-
tract with the contractor, enables the contractor to re-
cover for damages on the contract, or in the alternative, 
in quasi contract under the theory of quantum meruit. 
Citing abundant authority, this Court held in Par risk v. 
Tahtaras, supra, that recovery could be had either on 
the contract or in quantum meruit. In this case Ex-
quisite elected to counterclaim on the contract as 
amended. 
CONCLUSION 
Exquisite Home Builders, Inc. signed the contract 
with plaintiffs on October 7, 1971 —- several months 
after the Sherwood Drive lot had been purchased and 
the plans drawn. The work of Exquisite conformed to 
the plans and specifications, and after the plans were 
amended its work conformed to the amended plans. 
Plaintiffs have complained that the positioning of 
the house by Exquisite was wrong, but plaintiffs have 
never, in the trial or in their brief, stated where the 
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house should have been positioned. If the plaintiffs 
would have stated their desires as to the position of the 
home, the same would have been completed since Ex-
quisite remained ready, willing and able to perform. The 
truth is that the plaintiffs suffered a change of mind 
and refused to cooperate with Exquisite. 
The responsibility for the defective plans and 
specifications rests with the owners or with those de-
signing the plans on behalf of the owners. The fact 
remains that the plans were drawn for the owners prior 
to the involvement of Exquisite, and that the plans 
were drawn defectively. 
The judgment rendered for Exquisite Home 
Builders, Inc. against plaintiffs should be affirmed, 
and Exquisite should recover its costs on appeal, in-
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ORVAL C. H A R R I S O N 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Exquisite Home Builders, Inc. 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 
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